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Introduction
The call for greater efficiency in public spending is not new, 
but today has additional force: how can we deliver more 
for (even) less? A combination of high public expectations 
about service quality and prolonged fiscal constraint requires 
New Zealand government departments to focus on the 
highest spending priorities, find more innovative ways to 
deliver services, and create efficiencies wherever possible 
(State Services Commission, 2010a, 2010b). The urgent need 
to refocus on providing smarter, better public services for 
less was a consistent theme over the past few years in public 
statements made by the previous secretary to the Treasury, 
John Whitehead. Whitehead identified developments in the 
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public sector in the United Kingdom 
as a potential model for New Zealand, 
particularly the speed with which ‘new 
thinking [was] converted into action’ 
in the pursuit of efficiency (Whitehead, 
2010), and referenced in particular a 
programme launched in the UK in 2004 
as an innovative public reform initiative 
from which New Zealand might learn 
(Whitehead, 2009a).
The dissertation on which this article 
is based (Robinson, 2010) considered 
some applicable lessons from the 
implementation of the efficiency agenda 
to which Whitehead referred.1 The focus 
was on four major aspects of the reform 
agenda: 
• central control of the reform 
programme
• targets as a performance management 
tool
• quality of performance data; and 
• leadership issues.
Much further work could be done, for 
example on the use of e-government and 
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other IT initiatives in securing efficiency 
savings, but these fall outside the scope 
of this article.
The Blair–Brown administration of 
1997–2010 was strongly results-focused, 
and introduced a number of public 
sector financial management reforms, 
which put the UK among world 
leaders at the time (Scheers, Sterck and 
Bouckaert, 2005). Following a number 
of smaller initiatives to improve value 
for money incrementally, Sir Peter 
Gershon2 was asked in 2003 to conduct 
a review of public sector operations 
across government and to make 
recommendations about expenditure 
and efficiency. His report (Gershon, 
2004) proposed specific areas in which 
efficiency savings could be made, and 
urged that a culture of efficiency should 
be instilled throughout the public sector. 
A new efficiency programme, based on 
Gershon’s findings, was announced to 
begin in April 2005. It aimed to achieve 
£21.5 billion of efficiency gains by 2007–
08.3 Departments were each assigned 
an efficiency target and responsibility 
for apportioning the target across a 
range of projects.4 The programme 
was regarded as more broadly-based, 
and more ambitious, than any previous 
attempt to tackle efficiency in the British 
government sector. In the complexity of 
the reform agenda, in the universality 
of its aims, and in the close personal 
attention paid to it by both Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and Chancellor of 
the Exchequer Gordon Brown, this was 
a new, and unique, public management 
reform initiative for the UK (PAC, 2006, 
Q.15). 
In 2007, Brown published a 
Comprehensive Spending Review, 
which aimed to continue the impetus 
of the original efficiency reform agenda. 
This introduced a Value for Money 
programme (VfM), setting out new 
targets to be achieved between the end 
of Gershon programme and 2010–11 
with the intention of achieving a further 
£35 billion in efficiency savings.
The Labour administration was 
replaced in May 2010 by a Conservative–
Liberal Democrat coalition with its 
own efficiency agenda. The coalition 
announced an end to Labour’s focus on 
centrally-mandated efficiency targets in 
favour of reducing waste and improving 
procurement, and it set up a new 
Efficiency Reform Advisory Group. The 
close of the Labour era therefore provides 
a tidy end point to the efficiency reform 
issues considered in this article.
Central control
In initiating its efficiency programme, the 
Labour government was explicit about 
the need to incentivise the public sector 
towards greater efficiency (Gershon, 
2004). Targets were already being used 
by the administration as a key tool to 
motivate the public sector to pursue its 
most highly prioritised objectives with 
the rigour desired (Mandelson, 2010). 
Using targets to reinforce the importance 
of the efficiency objectives would thus 
have been natural. According to the 
then chair of the PAC, Tony Wright, the 
prime minister firmly believed that it 
was wrong to have permanent secretaries 
operating independently, without strong 
central control, and that accountability 
and improvement of standards should be 
driven from the centre. The deployment 
of centrally-imposed targets to effect the 
efficiency agenda gave rise, however, to 
what Wright described as an ‘endemic 
tension’ between the strong control 
exerted by the centre, as a means of 
enforcing progress towards a coherent 
and coordinated set of efficiency 
goals, and departments’ concern that 
a too-controlling centre interfered 
unnecessarily with their capacity to run 
their own business in pursuit of those 
same goals (Lawson, 2009). This is 
broadly consistent with developments 
throughout the OECD during the period, 
where efforts in other jurisdictions to 
decentralise power had exacerbated 
problems of public sector coordination 
and coherence (Peters, 2008).
The extent to which central control 
was exerted varied as the efficiency 
programme progressed, with greater 
latitude for departments being permitted 
in the later VfM iteration. This was the 
result of a deliberate trade-off decision 
by the Treasury, to assuage departmental 
concerns that it had been interfering 
in ‘every nook and cranny of every 
department’ in their management of 
their efficiency targets (PAC, 2010b, 
Qq26, 34). Neither approach was 
ideal, however. The central control 
initially exerted by the Treasury had 
enabled much better coordination of 
the programme, albeit by significantly 
increasing the administrative and 
reporting burden on departments. VfM 
provided more scope for departments 
to manage their own affairs without 
Treasury involvement, but this meant 
that the Treasury now also had to rely 
on departments to ensure that published 
savings would stand up to scrutiny and 
that programmes were on track.
The efficiency agenda was taken 
extremely seriously by both the prime 
minister and the chancellor. This was 
emphasised by the comparatively rare 
combined approach to management 
of the programme by the two, who 
were more accustomed to running 
their priority objectives in parallel 
(Mandelson, 2010). Both insisted on 
being briefed personally and regularly on 
progress against efficiency targets. This 
close political attention can be expected 
to have created additional pressure for 
officials; it certainly would have been 
a strong motivator for department 
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The central control initially exerted by the Treasury 
had enabled much better coordination of the 
programme, albeit by significantly increasing the 
administrative and reporting burden on departments.
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Professor Christopher Hood of Oxford University 
argues that the ‘element of terror’ involved in  
the targets in UK public sector management  
made it a ‘distant cousin’ of the system in  
the USSR ...
heads to ensure that successes could be 
reported swiftly – and, doubtless, that 
failings did not lead to adverse attention. 
The National Audit Office (NAO) 
reported early on that the six-monthly 
progress reports to the prime minister 
and chancellor were ‘ensuring that 
efficiency remains a priority for senior 
management in departments’ (NAO, 
2006, 7). But preparing regular briefs at 
this level represents a substantial burden 
for those from whom the data must be 
sourced; feedback from departments 
and central agencies alike suggested that 
finding the balance between appropriate 
levels of reporting to meet ministerial 
requirements and not overburdening 
departments was not easy. 
Departments had not previously 
been involved in such a complex or 
wide-ranging programme, and looked 
to central bodies for guidance. An 
efficiency team within the Treasury was 
set up for this purpose but struggled, 
particularly early on. Frequent turnover 
of key personnel affected its ability 
to help departments grapple with the 
complexities of the new programme, 
and hindered the team in winning 
departments’ trust to allow operating 
as the ‘critical friend’ that had been 
envisaged (NAO, 2006, 6). Departments 
found themselves, for example, 
instructing their relationship managers 
instead of the other way round: ‘At the 
beginning it seemed they were coming 
and going every month … [I]t would 
be really helpful to have someone with 
a consistent view of the old stories’ 
(NAO, 2006, 48). Had the importance of 
a stable efficiency team been recognised, 
more could perhaps have been done to 
prioritise forward planning by staff.
There was also a difference of opinion 
between the centre and departments 
about the use – and usefulness – of 
relevant guidelines. Departments 
complained that long delays in publishing 
guidelines jeopardised effective delivery 
(NAO and Audit Commission, 2006), 
and expressed concern that at least one 
Treasury-approved methodology for 
measuring savings was not robust enough 
to produce defensible reporting (NAO, 
2010b). Central agencies, meanwhile, 
felt that formal guidance was often 
disregarded. The Treasury, for example, 
had produced a ‘clear and comprehensive 
framework’ for measuring efficiencies, 
but assessed that departments were not 
applying it effectively and therefore 
remained weak in a number of key areas 
(PAC, 2007, 2008).
A good dialogue did develop at 
senior levels between the Treasury’s 
Office of Government Commerce 
and the permanent secretaries of key 
departments. This close dialogue was 
credited with the openness with which, 
for example, the Department for 
Work and Pensions had felt prepared 
to disclose to the Treasury certain 
shortcomings regarding the calculation 
of its efficiency baseline, thereby enabling 
swift action and rectification (PAC, 
2007). There is evident value in building 
relationships which facilitate this degree 
of trust, although of course they require 
resourcing, commitment and time if 
they are to develop effectively. 
Targets and incentives
The use of targets and performance 
indicators to steer the behaviour of 
the public sector and assert control 
had been much advocated in Western 
countries from the 1980s onwards (see, 
for example, Pollitt, 1986 and Carter et 
al., 1995). In the UK, the implementation 
of the efficiency agenda primarily used 
the same quantitative, time-limited 
targets for controlling and monitoring 
departmental performance as had been 
a key factor of UK public management 
since the late 1990s. 
This approach obviously relies for 
its effectiveness on the extent to which 
departments are motivated to comply. 
Professor Christopher Hood of Oxford 
University argues that the ‘element of 
terror’ involved in the targets in UK 
public sector management made it a 
‘distant cousin’ of the system in the USSR 
(Hood, 2006, 515; Bevan and Hood, 
2006, 517). According to Hood, those 
responsible for delivering against targets 
were incentivised to do so by strong 
concern about what would happen to 
under-performers. He notes regular 
gallows humour references to a ‘hanging 
admirals’ culture,5 or to ‘P45 targets’,6 
and posits widespread expectations 
among senior officials that the penalties 
for failing to meet targets would be 
severe, perhaps even entailing job loss 
(Hood, 2006, 2007; Hood, Emmerson 
and Dixon, 2009). 
These assumptions were probably 
exaggerated. The summary dismissal of 
senior officials is generally not easy to 
accomplish, and, despite seeming  agree-
ment about a ‘P45 targets’ system, there is no 
evidence to suggest a significant increase in 
the incidence of sackings or other similarly 
severe forms of punishment among senior 
UK civil servants at any stage after targets 
were introduced – such as should certainly 
have been expected if the penalties for 
failure were as harsh as popularly supposed. 
Nor, in fact, were there any formal or legal 
sanctions available to ministers or to the 
Treasury if departments did not fulfil their 
objectives (Hood 2006; Norman, 2008). To 
an extent, though, whether or not officials’ 
belief in the willingness of their masters to 
‘hang’ those who failed them had any basis 
in reality is not important. What matters 
is that the belief in the threat was genuine 
enough to have incentivised behaviours 
in a certain way, so that achievement of 
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the targets did indeed become the highest 
priority of senior officials. 
One of the problems in a target 
approach to performance management 
is determining whether, as well as 
motivating the pursuit of certain desired 
objectives, it is at the same time having 
a perverse or unintended effect by 
incentivising unwanted behaviours, or 
by disincentivising work towards non-
targeted outcomes. There is a degree 
of risk in relying too heavily on targets 
to motivate performance, in that an 
organisation may start to treat the 
achievement of its targets as its raison 
d’être and, as a result, disregard or abandon 
activities which do not contribute directly 
to them. Outcome-focused management 
thereby loses ground to the output-
focused, where activity can be more easily 
quantified.
Naturally there are circumstances 
where targets offer the most direct and 
effective way of achieving a goal. For 
example, it seems unlikely that a dramatic 
reduction in waiting times for hospital 
treatment in England would have come 
about without extremely specific targets 
(Hood, 2007). But there are also many UK 
examples of unintended consequences: 
such as training which was started but 
not necessarily completed because the 
target measured only commencement. 
Studies also suggested that departments 
overly focused on efficiency targets did 
not evaluate the impact of efficiency-
motivated changes on service provision 
quality as experienced by clients. For 
example, an initiative which measured 
improvements in the time taken to answer 
ringing telephones in a customer contact 
centre was not able to confirm whether 
customers’ problems were actually resolved 
during their first contact (PAC, 2007; for 
further details, see Robinson, 2010).
The Treasury and the NAO both 
reported that departments were 
consistently planning for efficiency-
related changes that could be delivered 
within a three-year reporting period, 
rather than anything more innovative, 
because the latter might have taken 
longer than three years and would not be 
rewarded (see NAO, 2010b, 7, 27-9.) The 
efficiency programme was thereby judged 
to have failed to incentivise departments 
to take a long-term approach to tackling 
the efficiency challenge by focusing 
them too intently on their targets (PAC, 
2010a). 
Spectacular results were reported for 
the initial tranche of efficiency targets. 
Against an original target of £21.5 billion in 
savings over three years, the public sector 
achieved an impressive £26.5 billion, an 
over-delivery of approximately 23%. Every 
department reported that it had not only 
met, but in almost every case exceeded, 
its target. The Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
claimed efficiency savings of 71% over its 
original target (HM Treasury, 2009). The 
original targets were admittedly intended 
to be realistic rather than stretch goals; 
this may go some way to explaining why 
departments seem to have found it so easy 
not just to meet but to exceed them. But 
that alone cannot satisfactorily explain 
such a preponderance of success stories. 
Either the targets allocated were so easily 
achievable that they were meaningless, 
or the performance reporting was 
suspect (or, perhaps, both). Whatever 
the case, the suspicion that, as so often 
in an environment of high-pressure 
expectations, an element of gaming may 
have played a part in the initial selection 
of the targets, or in the selection and 
interpretation of the data used to report 
results, cannot be dismissed. 
The NAO did not find evidence of 
deliberately dishonest gaming. It did, 
however, raise questions about calculations 
of efficiency gains, particularly the use of 
estimates and projections rather than hard 
data to record efficiencies, and the use of 
projected rather than real figures to report 
headcount reallocations (NAO, 2007). 
Meanwhile, a study of senior officials’ 
attitudes to targets concluded that ratchet 
effects and other similar forms of gaming 
were common. The officials interviewed 
for the study felt that some departments 
would ‘play the targets game to their 
advantage’ by negotiating undemanding 
targets that were hard to miss. They 
condemned the production of fictional 
performance data as dishonest, but felt 
that achieving reportable performance 
improvements by redistributing service 
was acceptable (results reported in Hood, 
2006). The responses point to a feeling, 
at least among senior Whitehall officials, 
that gaming was not insignificant; while 
deliberate dishonesty seems unlikely, 
it may be assumed that creative use of 
performance data and other gaming 
techniques may have contributed to the 
startlingly successful results claimed 
against the first tranche of the efficiency 
targets.
Departments appeared to struggle 
to realise similar levels of performance 
under the VfM tranche of targets as 
had apparently been achieved under the 
Gershon programme. By March 2010, 
two years into the programme, only £15 
billon of the £35 billion total had been 
reported, leaving £20 billion for the 
final year. A key difference between the 
former and VfM had been that, although 
there was more direct involvement of 
the central agencies under Gershon, 
the reporting requirements themselves 
were comparatively more relaxed and 
less complex. This was recognised and 
tightened up during VfM. Without 
being simplistic, it could be suggested 
that the strong pressure on departments 
to demonstrate quick wins against 
the Gershon targets, coupled with a 
relatively relaxed reporting environment, 
may have had some bearing on the 
disproportionately good results which 
departments were able to report.
Devising good performance indicators, particularly 
to measure quality of service provision, is difficult; 
certainly harder than measuring financial data. 
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Performance information
Devising good performance indicators, 
particularly to measure quality of service 
provision, is certainly harder than meas-
uring financial data. Effective performance 
measurement for efficiency programmes 
can be particularly elusive (Griffiths, 2006). 
But good performance measurement 
is crucial in effective performance 
management. Representing new territory, 
the efficiency agenda involved complicated 
reporting and accountability parameters. 
Accurate performance measurement, while 
important,  was difficult, not least because 
departments were attempting to use long 
established  information systems designed 
for other purposes to collect and analyse 
new and more detailed forms of data. 
(NAO, 2006; PAC 2006, 2010a).
Ongoing concern was expressed by 
the NAO, by independent commentators 
and by the PAC about the quality of the 
UK public sector’s performance data (see 
Robinson, 2010 for details). The impact of 
generally poor performance information 
on stakeholders’ capability to accurately 
assess the progress of the efficiency 
programme was frequently identified as a 
major issue. Indeed, the PAC repeatedly 
queried whether any reliance could be 
put on any of the efficiency claims made 
by departments, or by Treasury on their 
behalf (PAC, 2006, 2010). 
Despite the highly controlled way in 
which the programme was run, it must 
have been difficult to accurately gauge 
the real success of the efficiency projects 
given a lack of robust performance data. 
It is hardly a surprise, however, noting 
the high political importance assigned 
to success, that where performance 
data was unreliable or incomplete there 
should be strong motivation to put the 
best possible reflection on whatever data 
was available. It also seems likely that 
decisions in managing the programme 
must sometimes have been made on the 
basis of old or unreliable data. 
Many efficiency projects were not 
stand-alone initiatives, which made it more 
difficult to capture the overall benefits 
brought about by changes in one area. 
For example, in its service improvement 
project, the Department of Health set out 
to measure efficiency gains from certain 
improvements in patient care. Accurate 
performance reporting would have had to 
take account of the complex network of 
relationships within the National Health 
Service, the continuous changes to the 
various patient services offered, and the 
requirement for ongoing new investment. 
Attempting to capture accurately the real 
relationships between inputs and outputs 
proved complicated and hard to quantify 
for several departments. In some cases, 
efficiency gains were being realised only 
after many years of investment in complex 
programmes with many benefits, some 
not associated with the efficiency projects 
themselves (NAO, 2007).
Management by targets or performance 
indicators can at times have an unintended 
impact on the quality of service provision. 
An initial sharp rise in performance may 
be followed by flatlining, or distortions 
may become evident as non-incentivised 
outputs receive less attention than those to 
which performance indicators have been 
assigned (Hood, Emmerson and Dixon, 
2009). Organisations may be so focused 
on ascertaining whether they are achieving 
their objectives that they fail to collect 
useful data on what their clients actually 
want, or whether they are meeting their 
needs. In the UK, departments were in 
many cases not able to provide assurance 
that service quality had not deteriorated 
as a result of their efficiency-related 
reforms. Additionally, there seemed to be 
little or no ability to correlate the impacts 
of the efficiency programme across the 
government sector; it was hard to tell 
whether the activities of one department 
in pursuit of efficiency were undoing the 
work of another (by transferring demand) 
(NAO, 2007).
Leadership
Some of the deficiencies identified in 
implementing the efficiency agenda were 
linked with issues of institutional capacity, 
such as internal capability weaknesses 
(especially financial expertise); poor 
knowledge and information management; 
and problems with inspiring commitment 
to the programme. Effective and 
engaged leadership is critical in building 
institutional capacity and making a 
difference in the public sector.
The efficiency agenda was introduced 
into a public management environment 
characterised by political impatience, 
pressure on departmental resources, and 
an anxiety on the part of the public sector 
leaders to produce swift success (Amman, 
2006). Major change in organisational 
culture usually requires an incremental, 
cumulative approach. The prevailing 
culture in Whitehall at the start of the 
21st century, however, does not seem 
likely to have rewarded a slow-and-steady 
approach to change. This may go some 
way to explaining the felt pressure to 
meet targets as quickly as possible, and 
also the lack of success in getting real 
culture reform to stick.
The efficiency initiative had introduced 
a change programme as complex as any 
seen before, anticipating both structural 
and cultural change (NAO, 2006). The 
goal was never just to save cash, but 
rather to instil such a commitment to 
efficiency in public sector culture that it 
became ‘absolutely embedded in the DNA 
of how departments do their business’ 
(PAC, 2006). There was a consensus that 
efficiency had not been the driver that 
it could have been, and that minds and 
hearts needed to change (PAC, 2010b). 
The goal was never just to save cash, but rather  
to instil such a commitment to efficiency in  
public sector culture that it became ‘absolutely 
embedded in the DNA of how departments  
do their business’ ...
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Strong strategic leadership was intended 
to be a key factor in changing this. 
A distinct change in attitude at 
senior levels was certainly evident. 
Senior departmental officials contributed 
meaningfully, and demonstrated an 
active interest and involvement in the 
programme, thereby confirming to staff 
that this initiative was different (NAO, 
2006). It may be surmised that this 
noticeable change in attitude may have 
been due, at least in part, to the prime 
minister’s strong interest: 
Two years into the programme, I cannot 
go into any Department in Whitehall 
without finding that efficiency is 
discussed frequently, regularly and 
at main Board level. It is a key topic 
on the agenda and an essential part 
of the business planning process of 
every Department. Two or three years 
ago you would not have seen that in 
most Departments in Whitehall; it is a 
significant shift in attitude and culture 
… All Departments are on a journey 
that they were not on before the 
Gershon Report was written. … We 
would not have achieved that without 
an efficiency programme. (PAC, 2007, 
Qq14, 79)
But senior officials’ engagement with 
the efficiency reform project was not 
alone sufficient to effect the fundamental 
changes expected in their departments. 
Departments reported mixed results in 
securing full engagement in the efficiency 
programme, and there was evidence 
that many staff viewed it as just another 
economy drive. A 2007 set of case studies 
found that frontline local government 
staff felt that the efficiency programme 
had only added to their bureaucratic 
burden, while efficiency to them 
translated as cuts or job losses (Office for 
Public Management, 2007). 
The same study found that agencies 
which demonstrated high performance in 
achieving efficiencies were characterised 
by regular communication with all staff 
groups; openness to new ideas; and 
a devolved approach which allowed 
individual areas to come up with their 
own strategies within broad parameters. 
This was seen as being critical in winning 
the backing of middle managers and 
more junior staff. Lower-performing 
entities, on the other hand, had generally 
adopted a more centralised and top-down 
approach, which was predominantly 
concerned with ensuring tight control 
over key efficiency-related funding and 
prioritisation decisions. 
The culture changes which it was 
imagined the efficiency programme 
would establish will not, paradoxically, 
flourish under the sort of management 
strategies deployed to ensure that the 
programme demonstrated quick wins. 
Creativity flourishes when there is a free 
flow of ideas around the organisation, 
when there is a culture of listening and 
engaging with new suggestions, and when 
people are encouraged to join up their 
thinking with that of others in different 
parts of the organisation (Bichard, 2000). 
But the environment into which the 
efficiency agenda was introduced tended 
to reward performance by recognising 
those who had completed tasks or met 
targets. The task-oriented way of acting 
that such a system encourages is generally 
not conducive to fostering creativity 
or risk-taking (Bichard, 2000), and 
has been criticised for detracting from 
attention needed to improve the overall 
performance of people and organisations 
or to harness the energy and insights of 
operational staff (Haldenby et al., 2009). 
Targets and indicators promote adherence 
to established routines and organisational 
processes. Motivating staff to effect 
comprehensive culture change had been 
a key factor in the efficiency reform 
narrative, but evidently more needed 
to be done in enabling staff to engage 
more creatively with the programme for 
themselves, thereby beginning to embed 
the desired orientation towards efficiency 
more decisively into the culture.
Conclusion
New Zealand and the UK are ordinarily 
considered to have been among the 
leading examples of the reforms of the 
1980s and 1990s, and the UK experience 
in introducing a comprehensive and pan-
government efficiency reform agenda was 
specifically referenced by the secretary to 
the New Zealand Treasury as a valuable 
lesson for New Zealand (Whitehead, 
2009a). Although different in scale, the two 
nations share some important institutional 
characteristics in executive government. 
New Zealand does not, perhaps, have 
the same degree of strong central control 
over the public sector as was evident 
during the Blair–Brown administration: 
central agencies are described as having 
rather to ‘cajole, nudge [and] inspire’ 
departments into implementing new 
initiatives (Norman, 2006). As in the 
UK, however, the variable quality of 
performance information and reporting 
(which has already been identified as an 
issue on which firm action must be taken 
(State Services Commission, 2009, 2010a, 
2010b)) would have to be addressed. 
Were New Zealand to follow the UK 
lead, meanwhile, energetic commitment 
from internal leadership would be very 
important, and thus confidence that 
senior officials had the necessary support 
for a certain amount of risk-taking in 
pursuit of the desired objectives (Ryan et 
al., 2008) would be as significant in New 
Zealand as in the UK context. 
Efficiency reform is challenging for any 
administration. The Labour government 
in the UK made a sustained effort to 
make a real difference in the efficiency of 
the management of the UK public sector 
during its period in office. Its efficiency 
The ambitious attempt to combine a long-term 
public management reform programme with a 
series of short-term resource re-allocation projects 
essentially did not work.
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agenda was comprehensive in approach 
and complicated in operation. Progress 
was undeniable. Financial management 
capacity in public sector departments 
improved; some savings were certainly 
achieved; and improvements to both 
quality of services and efficiency in their 
provision were recorded. A genuine 
focus on and attention to the aims of the 
efficiency agenda were also noticeable (at 
least at senior levels). 
But many of the spectacular early 
gains reported against efficiency targets 
were later dismissed as implausible. 
Quality of performance data was so poor 
that it proved unreliable in achieving 
the required reforms; concerns about 
goal displacement, gaming and other 
dysfunctional effects of a highly target-
focused performance management regime 
were also an issue. The right balance 
between maintaining a level of central 
control while permitting operational 
latitude in the pursuit of efficiency goals 
seems rarely to have been achieved. 
The ambitious attempt to combine 
a long-term public management reform 
programme with a series of short-term 
resource re-allocation projects essentially 
did not work. The use of targets to achieve 
the programme’s aims may have been a 
suitable approach to the latter objective, 
but could not incentivise the former; if 
anything, it stifled rather than encouraged 
culture change. While Gershon had 
initially envisaged steady rather than 
rapid progress towards efficiency goals as 
the way to ensure sustainability, this was 
overtaken by the political importance 
assigned to the programme, resulting 
in pressure to produce rapid wins. 
Ultimately, this strongly directive central 
oversight – which wanted to ensure that 
the programme was a success – was a 
major factor in its failure.
Coherent direction and robust 
oversight from the centre is of course 
extremely important. The UK experience 
teaches, however, that balance and 
proportionality are critical. The desire to 
strengthen central control cannot become 
so pervasive that it becomes restrictive. 
Flexibility and freedom extended to 
operational agencies will enable them 
to pursue efficiency objectives in a way 
which is relevant to local contexts, even 
if this involves taking risks. Achieving the 
right balance represents a complex set of 
relationships and is tricky to achieve; but 
is important to get right.
1 The dissertation was submitted to the School of Government, 
Victoria University of Wellington, in part-fulfilment of the 
requirements of the Master of Public Management degree, 
and was awarded the 2011 Holmes Prize for Public Policy. It 
is available from the author.
2 Then the head of the Office of Government Commerce, an 
independent office of the Treasury.
3 This equated to a saving of approximately 2.5%.
4 Targets had mostly been discussed and agreed between 
departments, the Gershon review team and the Treasury prior 
to the launch of the efficiency programme.
5 Voltaire famously joked in the mid-18th century that in the 
British Navy at the time, ‘From time to time they kill one of 
the Admirals, to encourage the others’ – an indirect reference 
to Admiral John Byng, executed in 1756 for negligence in 
the performance of his duty to the Royal Navy.
6 The P45 form is issued by an employer when an employee 
leaves their service; the term is often used to refer to 
termination of employment by the employer, i.e. sacking.
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humanity and governments over the coming 
decades – the drivers, possible shocks, risks 
and opportunities, and future scenarios
· The challenges for governance – what 
capacities and capabilities will the state need? 
What are the options for governance?
· Future-proofing the state: what does it mean, 
to what extent is it possible, and by what 
means?
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